France, was a distinguished antiquarian and classical scholar, and editor of the works of the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus. The oldest of the three brothers was Joseph (1856-1921), a politician who was for some time a collaborator of Gambetta and played a major role in the so-called Dreyfus affair. He also wrote a book on Diderot. His son Adolphe Reinach Adolf was the oldest of three children. His brother Heinrich, born on 4 June 1888, studied mainly law and philosophy, at first in Munich and Göttingen, and then later in the University of Giessen, where he earned his Doctorate in Law in 1910. His dissertation -Die Rechtsfähigkeit der Leibesfrucht -was a study of the question whether the unborn child has, or could have, legal rights and duties in civil law. Heinrich subsequently entered legal practice and during the 1920s he published reports on tax and business law. He was imprisoned after the Kristallnacht of 9 November 1938, but was able to emigrate in 1939 to Brazil. Adolf's sister Pauline entered the Benedictine convent at Wépion (Namur) in Belgium in 1924. In 1936 the convent moved to Ermeton-sur-Biert, where Pauline (Sister Augustina) died in 1977, having reached her 95th year.
In the Ostergymnasium in Mainz, Reinach acquired a deep interest in Plato:
The reading of Plato was, for the average grammar school student, nothing more than a translation exercise. Reinach however found himself so gripped by the content, that for as along as he lived the love of Plato and for philosophical analysis was never to leave him. Thus it was for him a matter of course, when his time at school was over, to turn to the study of philosophy. 4 He entered the University of Munich in the autumn of 1901, when he was still only 17 years of age. For three semesters he attended courses in a range of subjects, including political economy, art history and law. His main interest, however, was in psychology and philosophy, which he studied under Theodor Lipps. Reinach quickly became a member of the Munich "Akademische Verein für Psychologie", the discussion club of Lipps' students which was to play so important a role in the formation of early phenomenological movement. 5 It was almost certainly at the meetings of the Verein that he came into contact with Theodor Conrad, 6 Moritz Geiger, 7 Otto Selz, 8 Aloys Fischer, 9 Rudolf Hirsch, 10 Alfred Schwenninger, 11 and Eduard Schmidt, 12 who were at that time among the most outstanding of Lipps' students.
It was however Johannes Daubert who was intellectually the most important figure among the Munich phenomenologists, and it was Daubert who was to be of most significance for Reinach's later philosophical development. Already in this period Daubert was working on just those topics -positive and negative judgements, impersonalia, dispositions, Sachverhalt and Gegenstand -which were later to play a central role in Reinach's work.
A letter to Conrad of January 31, 1903 testifies to the range of Reinach's interests at this time:
I'm reading Wundt's Grundriß der Psychologie . . . attending Lipps' lectures on Psychology and Aesthetics, and have to write up a paper for his seminar . . . But I occupy myself more assiduously with Richard Wagner . . . I have plunged with such sympathy into his works and am trying to get clear about his aesthetic principles.
In the same letter, Reinach has this to say about his plans for the future: 6 Author of Zur Wesenslehre des psychischen Lebens und Erlebens, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1968. 7 Geiger published works in a range of subjects, from aesthetics and theoretical psychology to the axiomatics of Euclidean geometry. 8 Selz was an important member of the Würzburg school of psychologists around Oswald Külpe and Karl Bühler. His magnum opus, Über die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufs (2 vols., Stuttgart: Spemann, 1913, Bonn: Cohen, 1922), contains anticipations of ideas on problem-solving which have since played a role in computer-oriented work in cognitive theory. 9 See Aloys Fischer, Leben und Werk, vol. I, ed., by Karl Kreitmair, Munich: Bayerischer Schulbuchverlag, 1950. 10 Author of a review of W. Jerusalem's Der kritische Idealismus und die reine Logik, in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 134, 1909, 266-74 . This review contains a defence of Husserl's Logical Investigations against Jerusalem's attaches which is entirely characteristic of the Munich phenomenologists. Husserl's suggestion that Hirsch served in 1905/06 as private secretary to Brentano (see his letter to Brentano of 3 January 1905, published in Grazer Philosophische Studien, 6, 1978, p. 7) is erroneous (Hirsch was at that time in Munich), but seems to be correct for 1906/07. He studied in Munich, with some interruptions, from 1899 to 1912. In later years he lived in his home town of Pilsen (now Pizeň, Czechoslovakia). 11 The psychiatrist Schwenninger studied in Munich from 1901 to 1907. He wrote a dissertation entitled Der Sympathiebegriff bei David Hume, in which he expounds Hume's treatment of the concept of sympathy as presented in both the Treatise and the Enquiry. Hume is criticised in particular for his psychologism and for the failure to distinguish between perception and perceived object. Schwenninger later moved over to the medical field, where he was in close touch with Ludwig Binswanger. 12 After studying philosophy and psychology under Lipps from 1899-1901, Schmidt became an archaeologist. He took his dissertation under Furtwängler with a work entitled Lauf und Flug in der archäisch-griechischen Kunst (1908).
I will not become a psychologist, an aesthetician, a critic or the like. The fact that I still lack the capacity for the intensive work that is required of a psychologist probably does not mean much, as I am still very young. But I am only too well aware that I lack also true sympathy and enthusiasm for the subject-matter, and that is of greater significance.
13
In the winter term of 1901/02 and in the subsequent summer term Hermann Kantorowicz, the philosopher of law who was later to found the Freirechtsschule (Free Law Movement), had stayed in Munich, taking some courses on political economy, a field taught at the University there by Lujo Brentano, brother of the philosopher Franz Brentano. In Lujo Brentano's seminar Reinach and Kantorowicz seem to have come into contact with each other. When Kantorowicz, in the winter of 1902/03, moved to Berlin where he continued his work on the history of law, he probably set Reinach an example which motivated him to follow Kantorowicz. At any rate Reinach spent the summer term of 1903 in Berlin, too, where his energies do not, however, seem to have been directed towards either philosophy or psychology. He apparently studied there mainly jurisprudence, and Kantorowicz reported that he was impressed by Reinach's 'considerable talent and aspirations.'
14
In the winter term of 1903/04 he returned to Munich, where he stayed for three further semesters, working in particular on Husserl, though his attention was caught also by Stefan Witasek's criticism of Lipps' Leitfaden der Psychologie
15
During this period he figured as an experimental subject in a series of experiments on the psychological problem of intensive magnitudes and on phenomenal thresholds which were carried out by Moritz Geinger. 16 Together with Geiger and Conrad, Reinach attended the first congress of the newly-founded "Gesellschaft 13 'On the other hand', Reinach goes on, life out there attracts me powerfully. I feel moved to rush into it and to act against all those vile scoundrels who are active there. But for politics one needs political economy and that is why I have chosen this as a subsidiary subject, for the time being at least. For when all is said and done, I want to earn my doctorate in psychology in the first place, on the one hand because philosophy is a good thing for me as a person, and then also because I don't exactly know whether I would not at a later date like to switch over to it. 16 See Geiger, "Methodologische und experimentelle Beiträge zur Quantitätslehre", in T. Lipps, ed., Psychologische Untersuchungren, 2, 1906, 325-522. In contrast to Meinong, who utilised an opposition between 'divisible' and 'indivisible' magnitudes, Geiger formulated an opposition between difference magnitudes and intensive magnitudes. This enabled him to take account e.g. of the fact that distances between objects are non-intensive yet also non-divisible. für experimentelle Psychologie", which was held in Giessen from 18 to 21 April 1904, immediately before the start of the summer term.
17
Most of his time seems, however, to have been devoted to work for his doctoral examinations in history and penal law and to the preparation of his thesis. This may have been the reason why he described the summer term of 1904 as a 'nervous and unphilosophical semester'. 18 One problem which caught his attention he characterised as follows:
The question: how does the child know that grown-up people 'mean' something by their words, is answered by Lipps thus: it sees how they point to something and simultaneously hears a complex of sounds. To me this seems merely to be a way of getting round the problem. For words and pointing, no matter whether the latter consists in moving the arms, in a play of features, etc., are special cases of expression in general. And the problem was: how does the child come to understand an expression, and more specifically the expression of words? To this one surely cannot give an answer which involves appeal to another form of expression, to 'pointing'. For then of course the question still remains: How does the child know that by moving the arms etc. something is meant?
19
This problem has of course a distinctly Wittgensteinian ring, like so much of Reinach's philosophy. It is not solved by Reinach in his letter, but its appearance at this early stage gives a hint of the acuteness of his philosophical mind. The problem arose in connection with Reinach's work on what might nowadays be called legal hermeneutics: how are we to determine the intentions of the law-giver, given that these intentions are available to us only in written or printed words?
On December 20, 1904, three days before his 21st birthday and less than 4 years after entering university, Reinach earned his doctorate in philosophy under Lipps with a work on the concept of cause in the penal law (Reinach 1905), the first section of which is devoted to the general problem of legal interpretation. The work did not go unnoticed. It was reviewed by Gustav Radbruch, who attacked it for its method of interpreting the concept of the law exclusively by recourse to the intentions of the law-giver. He did insert one work of praise for the work, describing it as a 'Talentprobe'. But Radbruch's negative review of Reinach's work caused their common friend Kantorowicz to write a strongly worded letter to Radbruch: He attended courses on commercial law by Philipp Heck, formerly a student of mathematics (and sometime fellow-student of Husserl in Leipzig). He also attended lectures on psychology by Heinrich Maier and a miserable seminar on Spinoza by yet another neo-Kantian, Erich Adickes. In a letter of Nov. 26, Reinach wrote to Conrad paraphrasing Adickes' criticism of Spinoza's thesis that 'a true idea must agree with its object' (Ethics, I Axiom 6):
This thesis cannot be correct, because we know nothing at all about how things really are -Kant, too, pointed this out -and the whole world is only in our consciousness, -and outside of consciousness there is nothing, -and in any case colours are not really colours at all but only aether-waves . . . 'God forgive them,' Reinach wrote, 'they know not what they do. ' Of much greater significance for his own later development, however, were the lectures and seminars he attended on the penal law by the great German legal theorist Ernst Beling. As he wrote to Conrad in the same letter:
Some of the jurists here seem to be very clever. The penologist Beling has written a quite outstanding book; I guarantee you that there is more thinking in that book than M law. Over more than 500 pages he discusses the various levels and types of analysis appropriate to:
1. the crime considered as an action 2. the crime considered as a typical case of a particular sort of action 3. the crime considered as an illegal action 4. the crime considered as an action to which guilt is attached 5. the crime considered as an action liable to punishment, and so on.
36
He considers the relations of criminal actions of different types to each other, to the agent or agents involved, and to the processes of law and punishment to which they give rise. And he discusses the various sorts of modifications of these relations -the standard and non-standard ways in which a given action can be an instance of its type, the standard and non-standard ways in which subjects can be involved in crimes (as accomplices, as accessories, as victims, etc.), the standard and nonstandard ways in which a criminal action can be the object of a legal process, and so on. 37 The importance for the penal law of the notion of typicality is clear: the punishment for a crime is a function of the type of behaviour that is involved. Beling's work can indeed be seen as an attempt to provide an account of the various ways in which rightful or wrongful behaviour can come to be demarcated into delict-types of different sorts.
The whole constituted by the different elements of a given piece of criminal behaviour constitutes a unity, Beling argues, in virtue of some 'unifying schema'. In the case of battery, for example, a chain of actions is organised around the schema: injuring, or wrongfully bringing oneself into contact with, another individual. If battery is to occur, then 1. this schema must, as a matter of necessity, be realised in certain actions of the offender and in certain consequences on the side of the victim, and 2. these actions and results must each be accompanied by a certain mental state on the part of the individuals involved. It is the unifying schema, according to Beling, which brings these two factors together, making of the delict-type an independent, integrated whole. 38 Where the schema is absent, or is only partially realised, then the delict-type fails to be realised also, or is realised only in one or other modified form. 36 To see the distinction between 2. and 3., consider, for example, the actions of a soldier in a state of war. 37 The notes which follow are derived from the summary of Beling's position presented in his Die Lehre vom Tatbestand, Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 1930. 38 More precisely: Beling distinguishes between primary and secondary delict-types (the distinction between, for example, murder and attempted murder, or between theft and sheltering a thief). Where instances of primary delict-types are independent, capable of existing in their own right, instances of secondary delict-types are dependent formations, in need of supplementation by instances of corresponding primary delict-types with which they are associated. It is from the latter that they gain their unity and it is upon the latter that they depend for their existence. A similar sort of dependence applies also in relation to the concepts Every delict-type rests upon a unifying schema which is 1. realised in some objective event, and 2. reflected in some mental act or state on the part of the criminal.
It is, therefore, possible to distinguish abstractly within the schema as a whole both external elements of action and result, and internal elements of decision, deliberation, premeditation, etc. These external and internal moments may conform or fail to conform to each other in a variety of ways, thereby yielding behaviour which falls within delict-types of the various kinds. Only in the presence of an appropriate schema can the legal process even begin to establish that a given individual is liable to punishment of a given sort. The penal law is thereby in effect a catalogue of delict-types with their associated schemata and associated scales of punishment. The legal sphere as a whole is in fact constituted by a net of interdependent typical formations, and all other, extra-legal concepts (railway, dog, poison, etc.) play a role in this sphere only insofar as they enter into relations with such specifically legal formations.
The relevance of Beling's investigation to Reinach's own legal theory will be evident already from the very style and terminology of Reinach's monograph on "The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law" of 1913. Reinach indeed mentions explicitly in the introduction to this work that:
Whilst we have limited ourselves here to the setting forth of some of the a priori foundations of the civil law, we are convinced that the other legal disciplinesespecially the penal law and constitutional and administrative law -are capable of and require such a foundation also. 39 Four substantial points of similarity deserve to be mentioned here:
i. Beling's 'schema' (Tatbestand or typus regens) corresponds in a number of ways to Reinach's legal formation or Rechtsgebilde, though it lacks some of the a priori connotations of the latter. 39 Gesammelte Schriften (= GS), 172n.; trans., 48. 40 The question which schemata play a role within the framework of the law is for Beling a normative question. He talks of the schema being constitutive or regulative for the delicttype. (He also speaks of the schema as being logically or conceptually prior, as being that which makes the delict-type understandable -and he sees here an analogy with the relation between a piece of music and its performance.) He conceives the formation of given historically existing arrays of legal schemata as being also to some extent a matter of external social factors. Beling is, however, perfectly clear that the question as to which delict types exist in a given society and which specific scales of punishment are associated therewith is not an arbitrary matter -is not, e.g. a mere reflection of decisions of a law-giver.
It is interesting that Beling, like Reinach, makes a clear terminological distinction between 'Tatbestand' and 'Sachverhalt'. Thus in his Grundzüge des Strafrechts, 1930, Beling distinguishes between the Tatbestand 'als Bestandteil des gesetzlichen . . . Rechtssatzes' and the Sachverhalt 'als den konkreten Lebensfall, der juristisch beurteilt werden soll', a usage which was adopted, inter alia, by his student Karl Engisch.
ii. Both Beling and Reinach share the same doctrine of contextualism in legal theory (an element has legal significance only within the context of a Tatbestand or Sachverhalt).
iii. Both share the recognition of the two-sided nature of legal formations as entities which manifest both internal and external dimensions.
iv. Both share the recognition of the importance for legal theory of the dichotomy between standard or typical and derived or modified instances of legal types.
We shall see some of the consequences of this influence below. For the moment, however, we must rejoin our narrative where we left off. §5 1907-1909: TOWARDS A THEORY OF JUDGEMENT Reinach spent the Easter holiday of 1907 in Munich, where he met Dietrich von Hildebrand. 41 During this first half of the summer term of 1907 Reinach was still at Tübingen, where from April 18 to June 6 he took the First State Examination in Law. On June 8 he went to Göttingen to join Conrad, who was spending the summer semester studying under Husserl, and it is possible that he was able to attend the last part of Husserl's Dingvorlesung. At any rate he participated in Husserl's Saturday afternoon discussions on themes related to the lectures on thing and space.
During the three semesters that followed Reinach was again in Munich and he was soon actively engaged in the activities of the Verein, where works by James, Simmel, Łukasiewicz, Lipps, Stumpf and Bergson were being discussed. 42 He also participated in the regular discussions at the home of Daubert, where in the summer of 1908 the concept of sensation was being discussed. At this time he came into close contact with Max Scheler and Wilhelm Schapp. In Reinach 'I met the philosopher who impressed me most deeply with his unconditional love of truth, his intellectual power, his thoroughness, and his quite unique clarity. The many discussions of philosophical questions I had with him were a great gift to me. In Göttingen he came to be my only teacher.' Hildebrand became known mainly for his work in ethics. In later years he converted to Catholicism and wrote treatises of a speculative metaphysical kind based on Catholic doctrine. 42 On 6 February 1908 Alexander Rosenblum spoke on "Łukasiewicz: Analysis and Constitution of the Concept". On Rosenblum, a close friend of Reinach, see Husserl's Briefe an Roman Ingarden, "Erläuterungen", 143, n.12: 'He was a well-informed phenomenologist, but did not publish anything. All his manuscripts were destroyed in the Jewish revolt against Nazi terror in Warsaw in 1944.' 43 Schapp, who earned his doctorate under Husserl in 1909, is of interest here in that his career in some respects runs parallel to that of Reinach. He too applied logical and ontological notions -in his case the notion of a Geschichte (story, history) -in the sphere of legal theory. Geschichten, for Schapp, take the place of schemata for Beling and of Sachverhalte for Reinach, and they may in some respects be compared to the language games of the later Wittgenstein. He also discussed with Geiger the latter's lectures on the philosophy of mathematics. It is at about this time -in the summer term of 1908 -that Reinach's project of writing a work on the theory of judgement was beginning to take shape, though he had time to write down his ideas only in the vacation that followed the end of the summer term. A first draft of more than 200 pages was completed in September 1908, and the final version -"The Nature and Systematic Theory of Judgement", 44 
Husserl's spontaneous reaction was highly positive and Reinach spent a good deal of January and February in Göttingen paving the way for his habilitation. 45 He probably knew that Husserl had delivered a highly favourable report to the Faculty on February 20 46 and that the report of Julius Baumann had been positive also. Thus he returned, contented, to Munich, where he frequented Geiger's house and absorbed himself in music. 'Evening by evening,' he wrote to Husserl, 'I listen to the most beautiful concerts'.
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Towards the end of March, however, things seemed to take a sudden turn for the worse. The psychologist G. E. Müller, long an embittered opponent of Husserl's from Pfänder and Daubert (182). 44 This work was not published at the time, but in 1911 Reinach announced the imminent publication of a revised version under the title "Judgement and Sachverhalt" (see his 1911a, 196, n.1). This note is not included in the GS, which does however contain a reference to the work as containing 'investigations into the problem of judgement and the problem of the a priori' (6, n.1). At the end of 1908 there must have existed two, if not three copies of the work, but none of them seems to have survived. It is also unclear why the project of publishing the work was never realised. 45 Among the materials he submitted to the Faculty was a short Lebenslauf, from which we reproduce the following extract:
I spent the summer term of 1905 in Göttingen, where I occupied myself principally with logic and theory of cognition under the direction of Professor Husserl. During this time I also continued my legal and historical studies. In the conviction that it is advisable for a philosopher to master some individual science, I dedicated myself entirely to the study of jurisprudence . . . I spent the second half of the summer semester of 1907 in Göttingen, in order to take part in the 'intimate seminars' (not announced) of Professor Husserl.
I then studied further in Munich, occupying myself mainly with investigations in logic and the theory of knowledge from out of which the submitted work on Wesen und Systematik des Urtelis has grown. In addition I attended during this time lectures on mathematics and theoretical physics. (From Reinach's file in the Universitätsarchiv, Göttingen). 46 See the Appendix to Schuhmann's essay on Husserl and Reinach in this volume. 47 Letter of 26 March 1909.
phenomenology, 48 submitted a report on Reinach's manuscript which was negative in the extreme. 49 As Reinach conjectured in a letter to Conrad of May 3, 1909: Müller 'beat the sack, but he had the donkey in mind'. That is, he had used the affair simply as a welcome occasion to hit out at Husserl. In his attempt to torpedo the habilitation, however, Müller overstated his case so blatantly that the Faculty chose to follow not him but Husserl and Baumann, and by the beginning of May Reinach could once more be sure of the success of his habilitation. §6 1909-1912: WITH HUSSERL IN GÖTTINGEN Thus it was that, from the summer term of 1909 on, Reinach was firmly established in Göttingen.
After Munich, the town of Vassily Kandinsky, Paul Klee, Thomas Mann and Stefan George, Göttingen was a somewhat austere and provincial place. Reinach referred to it as a 'dirty nest' and he never felt really at home. 50 Nor could he expect much sympathy from the bulk of the faculty members who were to be his colleagues. On May 3, 1909 he wrote to Conrad: 'I become more and more afraid that habilitating in Göttingen was the most stupid thing I have done in all my life'. He nonetheless began to develop modest plans for the future.
I hope that in Göttingen I shall obtain what I aspire to: peaceful scientific work, sure of its goal, and a fruitful influence upon a circle of young people -even if, as befits my own scientific orientation, this circle should not be so large. (I'll gladly do without large audiences enticed by lectures free of charge and by an 'unequivocal liberalism'.) Only in this way can I hold on to the inner concentration that is necessary to me.
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Reinach moved to Göttingenin in mid-May 1909, when the semester had already begun. He organised an informal seminar on 'the main ideas of the new movement initiated by Husserl, with special reference to their historical context'. 52 The topics 48 Müller was one of the last representatives in Germany of the empiricist, associationistic approach to psychology. Husserl's phenomenology was, as far as he was concerned, nothing but pure verbiage ('Wortklauberei': see H. Spiegelberg, Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972, 34). Compare however n.53 below. 49 Though it did in fact conclude with the recommendation that Reinach should be admitted to the habilitation. 50 Postcards to Conrad of 8 March and 5 December 1909. 51 Letter to Husserl of 6 May 1909. 52 In an undated letter to Conrad of May or June 1909, Reinach gives the theme of his seminar as "die Hauptideen der neuen, von Husserl eigeleiteten Bewegung". This is of particular interest, since it seems to be the first place where phenomenology is referred to as a 'Bewegung', a manner of speech which would have been familiar to Reinach both from the German 'Jugendbewegung' of the time and also, perhaps, from William James' Pragmatism of 1907, Jerusalem's German translation of which had just appeared. In his "Markers on the Road to the Phenomenological Movement" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 43, 1983, 299-306) Schuhmann had traced the term to the year 1912, when it was used by Husserl and Conrad-Martius, and the fact that the latter was a devoted student of Reinach lends plausibility to the thesis that it is he who was responsible for so fatefully baptising phenomenology discussed included the concept of categorial intuition and the problems associated with the perception of states of affairs, and among the twenty participants one may note the names of von Hildebrand, Schapp and the psychologist David Katz.
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On June 12, 1909 Reinach gave a public lecture on "Problems and Methods of Ethics", thus completing the formal requirements for admission as a Privatdozent. This theme had been chosen by the Faculty from the three titles submitted by Reinach on January 30, the two others being: "Intuition and Cognition" and "Subjectless Sentences". While the former clearly draws on Husserl's Logical Investigations, the latter employs the title of a long series of articles published in the period 1884-1895 by Brentano's disciple Anton Marty. Reinach's attention was drawn to the problem of impersonal sentences ('It's raining', 'It's cold', 'It hungreth me') by his mentor Daubert. 54 Already in his habilitation thesis Reinach had interpreted impersonalia as one-membered judgements about one-membered states of affairs. Later on he put the point as follows: 'If one demands of states of affairs that they be two-membered, then this is to confuse states of affairs with relations.' 55 In fact states of affairs are divided by Reinach into 'one-membered, in impersonalia, two-membered, in normal categorial judgements, and three-or more-membered, in relational judgements.' The impact made by Reinach as a teacher is well expressed by Spiegelberg:
Independently of each other, the Göttingen students of phenomenology like Wilhelm Schapp, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexandre Koyré and Edith Stein, in their accounts of this period refer to Reinach, not to Husserl, as their real teacher in phenomenology. Hedwig Conrad-Martius even goes so far as to call him the phenomenologist par excellence.
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Reinach excelled through the brilliance and above all through the clarity of his lectures and seminars -a clarity which shines through also in his writings. Husserl, in contrast, was notorious for his monologising seminars and for his inability to follow other people's arguments. As Roman Ingarden points out, Reinach was not only A good teacher but above all brilliant in directing philosophical seminars. In his "Seminars for Advanced Students" he himself always outlined a central problem which was then worked on in the course of the academic year. The most interesting and instructive seminar in the last year of his activity was devoted to the problems of movement. The formulations he gave were clear and sharp, the as a 'movement' in 1909. 53 Katz was later to become famous through his book Die Erscheinungsweise der Farben und ihre Beeinflussung durch die individuelle Erfahrung (Zeitschrift für Psychologie, Ergän-zungsband 7), the 2nd edition of which was published in an abridged translation as The World of Colour (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1935). This work was written under the direction of G. E. Müller but as Katz himself points out (see p. 30 of the German edition), it was influenced also by Husserl's lectures in Göttingen. 54 See the fragment on impersonal sentences in the Gesammelte Schriften, 117-20; §12 of Smith's trans. of "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils". 55 Ana 379 B II 4, 250. 56 Ibid., 292. See also GS, 92, n.2 = Smith trans. 346. 57 The Phenomenological Movement, 191f. answers he gave to the participants in the seminars were precise and crisp, the arguments with which he defended his position were decisive, and he knew how to present vivid and convincing examples. What was especially valuable was the fact that he had the capacity immediately to understand and to see the correct context for our often awkwardly formulated questions or assertions. The course of the discussions was left to the participants, Reinach himself apparently functioning simply as custodian, seeing to it that one did not go astray. In fact however he was the very heart of our collective efforts, the active spirit opening up new aspects and paths of investigation in a creative attitude which never rested, never lost its grip in difficult situations. Thus one was brought by him to the attitude of creative philosophising and one could enjoy the participation in the development of a new philosophy, though one was in fact merely a philosophical child. 58 This is praise of a kind which Husserl never received from any of his students.
Yet the ability to convey difficult and complex ideas in a clear form did not come easily to Reinach. The preparation of his lectures not only took up a great deal of his time, it was experienced by him as an almost unbearable burden: 'All those brilliant performances were the result of unspeakable labour and pain.'
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Given the high standards which he set for himself, however, it is not surprising that most of his published works should have grown so readily out of his lectures, almost without revision.
As was befitting for a newly qualified Privatdozent, Reinach's courses were intended mainly for beginners. In the winter of 1909/10 he gave a course of lectures entitled "Introduction to the Theory of Cognition" 60 and a seminar on the philosophy of history, the latter involving particularly discussions of the Lippsian topic of empathy. Reinach also seems to have presided over the sessions of the Göttingen Philosophical Society, an association of Husserl-students in Göttingen which had been established by Conrad after the model of the Munich Verein. For all this, however, he continued to miss his Munich friends:
The loneliness in Göttingen is terrible. Sometimes I have felt so much out of this world that I have thought that I could bear it no longer. Then I do nothing but read railway-timetables and run out to the station. Not a nice story!
61
In the summer semester of 1910 he gave a course of lectures on Plato which seems to have particularly impressed those who heard it. 60 "Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie": we employ the translation "Theory of Cognition" rather than the more usual "Epistemology" or "Theory of Knowledge", here, in order to draw a firm line between the conception of Erkenntnistheorie as a descriptive discipline (a conception to be found above all in the work of Reinach, Stumpf and the early Husserl) and the views of the Neo-Kantians, for whom Erkenntnistheorie begins and ends with the question 'how is knowledge possible?' 61 Letter to Conrad of 27 October 1909. "Plato's Philosophy and its Relation to Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Cognition" -is entirely characteristic of Reinach's own philosophical concerns. More than thirty students attended and even more participated in his introductory seminar on Descartes. One of these, Kurt Stavenhagen, originally a classicist, 'was won over to philosophy through Reinach'. In the subsequent vacation he visited Brentano in Florence, calling on Pfänder and Daubert in Munich on the way. Pfänder was at this time laying plans for a Festschrift in honour of Theodor Lipps, to which Reinach promised to contribute. He submitted his contribution, "On the Theory of the Negative Judgement", deriving in part from his habilitation thesis, in the summer term of 1911. During this term he gave seminars on "Selected Problems of Contemporary Philosophy" and lectures on "Freedom of the Will, Imputation and Responsibility" -awakening his old interest in jurisprudence. It was in this period that Husserl embarked, with Reinach's assistance, upon the revision of the Logical Investigations, the first edition of which had been out of print for some years. The summer vacation of 1911 was spent by Reinach together with his sister and some of his friends, including von Hildebrand, in a village close to Munich. This made it possible for him to pay extensive visits to Daubert, Pfänder, and Geiger, with whom he discussed not only philosophy but also the plans for an annual publication of phenomenological research under Husserl's general editorship, plans which were eventually to materialise in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, E. Husserl (prop.), with Geiger, Scheler, Pfänder and Reinach as co-editors.
In the autumn of 1911 Privatdozent Adolf Reinach, Geismar-Chaussee 7, became a member of the Kant-Gesellschaft. 68 In the subsequent semester he repeated his course on freedom, imputation and responsibility, 69 dealing -among other things -with his new notion of social acts, 'acts, which are not complete in themselves' but 'to whose essence there belongs the directedness towards an addressee'. 70 These lectures, which included in particular an important treatment of the relevance to the problem of responsibility of the opposition between judgement as act and judgement as underlying conviction, 71 formed the basis of his article on "Deliberation: Its Ethical and Legal Significance", which was published in 1913. He also repeated his earlier introductory seminar on Descartes' Meditations. 73 Kluckhohn later enjoyed a distinguished career as a specialist in the field of German romantic literature, becoming famous as an editor of Novalis. At this time he was working on a book later published as Die Auffassung der Liebe in der Literatur des 18, Jahrhunderts und in der deutschen Romantik (Halle: Niemeyer, 1922), the greater part of which was written in 1912. In the Foreword to the book Kluckhohn writes: 'Den unvergeßlichen Adolf Reinach, mit dem ich mehrere Abschnitte, die die Geschichte der Philosophie betreffen, noch durchsprechen durfte, erreicht ein gedruckter Dank nicht mehr.' (vi).
tradition. 74 This sympathy is especially strongly marked in the work of Reinach: it can be detected already in the deliberate clarity of his prose, and is clearly indicated by his choice of subject-matter for lectures and seminars. These included, in the summer semester of 1912, a carefully worked out course on "Hume and English Empiricism", which dealt not only with Hume and the problem of causality but also with Bacon and Hobbes (on his nominalism), Locke (especially on his theory of generality and abstraction), and Berkeley (on the relation between perception and judgement). He concluded the course with a remark to the effect that:
The English empricists had many phenomenological insights. And these remain. But because no one had the idea of phenomenology these insights were misted over through the influence of Kant and his awful successors. Today things are somewhat different.
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In the same semester Reinach also gave a seminar on "The Philosophy of Civil Law", which was clearly a step towards the preparation of his contribution to the first volume of Husserl's Jahrbuch (1913) -"The A Priori Foundations of Civil Law" -Reinach's masterpiece on the theory of social acts.
The investigation of the action of promising and of other speech actions which forms the core of this work did not grow out of a vacuum. As we have already seen, it was influenced in part by ideas which Reinach had absorbed as a student of law. But it was also part of a more strictly philosophical tradition in Munich, rooted in Daubert's criticisms of Husserl.
The full extent of Daubert's contribution to the early history of speech act theory in Germany will be established only when his considerable Nachlaß has been more extensively transcribed. From our present point of view, however, it is sufficient to point out that, as we know from his manuscripts, Daubert had demonstrated in a long series of discussions with other phenomenologists in Munich that there are certain inadequacies in the theory of meaning set out in the Logical Investigations. Most importantly, this theory leaves no room for the meanings of questions, and of other, related uses of language which are not simply 'objectifying' in Husserl's sense. 76 Daubert stressed in particular the difference between 74 The 2nd of Husserl's Logical Investigations is of course devoted to the theories of abstraction of the British empiricists. Closely related ideas are then put forward in the sketch of a "Theory of Imperatives" drawn up by Pfänder in the summer of 1909, 77 but now in relation to commands and related phenomena (permissions, requests, etc.). Pfänder is concerned particularly with the various ways of classifying imperatives, and with the range of modifications to which they may be subjected -for example when they are addressed not to a single person but to a (determinate or indeterminate) collective. But Pfänder's work remains a mere sketch, and even the long list of different sorts of speech actions which is to be found in his Logik of 1921 78 is presented merely as a classification of the different varieties of 'logical content', i.e. in such a way as to make clear that Pfänder is not yet truly aware of the significance of the fact that the uses of language he describes are specific sorts of actions. That is, in Beling's, Reinach's and Bühler's terms, Pfänder fails to capture the external aspects of the structures involved. It is only in Reinach's monograph of 1913 that we find both (i) a truly systematic theory of the various different sorts of speech actions and of their modifications and (ii) a clear awareness that the phenomena in question belong to the world of action, that they have both an internal and an external dimension. (Amsterdam, 1987) . 77 This has now been published in the Pfänder-Studien, 295-324. 78 Halle: Niemeyer, 14f. 79 The next chapter in the history of the theory of speech acts belongs rather to linguistics, and more precisely to the work on the internal and external aspects of linguistic formations ('Sprachgebilde', 'Spechakte') of Bühler, Dempe, Nehring and others. Here, too, there is a Munich connection. Thus Dempe, whose dissertation of 1928 restates a Husserlian view of language and its functions, incorporating various modifications proposed by Bühler, was a student of Linke. In the winter of 1912/13 he was able to hold only a single series of introductory seminars on Kant's Prolegomena, dealing among other things with the problem of a priori existential judgements and the concept of space.
81 A good deal of his time seems to have been absorbed by the first volume of the Jahrbuch, of which he was at that stage managing editor. The proof-reading of Scheler's contribution, in particular, caused him trouble. The volume appeared in 1913, containing, in addition to the first book of the Ideas, works by all of Husserl's co-editors, including Reinach's work on the foundations of the civil law.
On the basis of the galley-proofs of Pfänder's contribution "Zur Psychologie der Gesinungen", Reinach did however organise a seminar on this work, in fact his first seminar for advanced students. Reference was made in the seminar also to Husserl's Ideen, Reinach insisting, in opposition to Husserl, that there is still room for a type of phenomenology as descriptive psychology.
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Also in the summer term of 1913 Reinach gave a series of seminars for advanced students, where he discussed colour and light and our experience of luminous objects. ('Can we imagine colourless geometrical figures?) 83 He gave also for the first time a course of lectures under the title "Introduction to Philosophy".
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The latter covered an extremely broad range of subjects, from the theory of substance to eudemonism and utilitarianism. Here we shall have space only to give some hints as to the flavour of Reinach's approach. External perception in the natural attitude is, Reinach says, 'a seeing which goes through changing modes of appearances straight to that which appears -the modes of appearance come to attention only in philosophical reflection.'
85 It is only with such reflection, which in fact destroys the original object-giving acts by dismembering them, that we become aware of the evidence or lack of evidence of cogitationes. Descartes' assertion that this sphere of phenomena is marked by an outstanding degree of clarity and distinctness is therefore unjustified. There follows a treatment of the 'ontological problem of the structure of the various types of object', including a discussion of the relation between the extension and colour of a material thing. 'Ontology', Reinach says, 'investigates the thing as thing, the process as process, the state as state. ' of affairs, and are accordingly true or false. 86 There follows a discussion of generality and of the a priori, and of Kant's unfortunate identification of the a priori with the formal and of the empirical with the material. Reinach then applies the results of this discussion to the sphere of ethics, criticising Kant's formalism there also: 'an act of forgiving has consequences in the world'; 'things do not have value as they have extension and the like'. 87 The true autonomy of ethics, Reinach insists, lies in the irreducibility of those feelings which relate to values: Kant, however, 'treats emotional position-takings as if they were no different from toothaches'. 88 The surviving notes of these lectures reveal that Reinach did not merely present results of his own work in the fields of theory of judgement and of ethics; he also took up some of the problems discussed by Husserl in the newly published Ideas I, and indeed he adopted Husserl's terminology of the 'natural attitude'. Thus it is something of an exaggeration to suggest that, after the publication of the Ideas, 'Reinach and, following him, the others broke away from the new developments' as Husserl had said to Dorion Cairns in 1931. 89 Rather, as ever, the Munich phenomenologists adopted a cautious, critical attitude to what was taking place around them.
It was at the beginning of this term that Edith Stein arrived in Göttingen:
In Breslau Mos[kiewicz] had given me the instruction: when one arrives in Göttingen one goes first of all to Reinach; he then takes care of everything else . . . Reinach was above all the mediator between Husserl and the students, for he understood extremely well how to deal with other people, whereas Husserl was pretty hopeless in this respect.
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In the winter semester of 1913/14 Reinach gave a broad historical course on the history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant and a further series of seminars for advanced students, "The Theory of Categories", discussing categorial concepts such as identity and ordinal and cardinal number, the concept of series, and including an excursus on Zeno's paradoxes of motion. 91 The transcriptions of these seminars are particularly interesting, since they reveal that Reinach was perhaps the only philosopher in Germany at this time lecturing on the work of Frege.
Stein has described her experiences of these courses in her autobiography as follows:
softly, freely, and elegantly, and everything was transparently clear and compelling. One had the impression that it did not cost him any effort at all. When later on I was able to look at these manuscripts I noticed to my extreme amazement that they were written out word for word from beginning to end . . . The hours spent in Reinach's fine study were the happiest of my entire time in Göttingen. We students were all agreed that, as far as method was concerned, it was here that we learned the most. Reinach discussed with us the questions which were occupying him in his own research, in that winter semester the problem of motion. It was not a matter of him lecturing and us learning, but rather a common searching, similar to what he had in the Philosophische Gesellschaft but under the hand of a sure guide . . . These evenings, too, however, were a torture to him. When the two hours were over, he could not bear to hear the word 'motion' anymore.
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In January 1914 Reinach gave his lecture "On Phenomenology" in Marburg, still at that time a centre of neo-Kantian philosophy. This lecture, too, contains a brief discussion of Frege, and more specifically of Frege's views on the status of assertions of number such as 'There are four horses pulling the Kaiser's coach'. Reinach dismisses Frege's conception of such statements as assertions about concepts; 'a concept under which four objects fall,' Reinach argues, 'is just as little four as a concept which subsumes material things is for that reason itself material'. 93 On returning to Göttingen Reinach provided the members of his seminar with an account of his 'missionary activities' in Marburg. 94 On the basis of Bell's notes we can hazard that his audience in Marburg had been particularly curious about the phenomenological theory of the judgement as positing act and about the conception of propositions [Sätze] as entities constituted in the process of thinking.
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Reinach himself, of course, held that there exist, in addition to judgements and propositions, also autonomous states of affairs, independent of our acts and prior to all constitution, and Kantians in Marburg -who included Natorp himselfseem to have been less sympathetic to this aspect of his position. The Austrians, in contrast, make precisely the opposite mistake: 'Stumpf, Bergmann (Bolzano too) . . . all Austirans confuse proposition and Sachverhald continually'.
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In 1914 Reinach published a long review of Natorp's Allgemeine Psychologie of 1912 (we can conjecture that his attention was drawn to this work in connection with his visit to Marburg). This was to be his last publication.
In April 1914 he participated, with Husserl, in the 6th Congress of Experimental Psychology in Göttingen. In the subsequent semester he repeated his lectures on 92 Stein goes on: 'Our circle raised certain objections to him at that time, and these finally compelled him to give up completely his original thesis. After Easter he began again from the very beginning. I was later able to discern this break too in his written drafts.' (Aus dem Leben einer jüdischen Familie, 194f.) These drafts were later edited by Stein as "Über das Wesen der Bewegung" (GS, 406-61). 93 "Hume and English Empiricism" and his introductory seminar on Descartes. He also gave once more a seminar for advanced students on "The Theory of Categories" in which Zeno's paradoxes were again discussed. In Ingarden's opinion this was 'the most interesting and instructive seminar' which Reinach ever gave. 97 It was apparently this seminar which inspired Alexandre Koyré's "Remarks on Zeno's Paradoxes" which are indeed dedicated 'to the memory of Adolf Reinach'.
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This seminar seems also to be identical with 'Reinach's small seminar on Bergson, Zeit und Freiheit, and on the concepts of continuum, time and movement' from which it is reported that Hans Lipps' interest in Zeno's and related paradoxes sprang.
99 §8 1914-1917 : AT THE FRONT For the winter of 1914/15 Reinach announced for the second time lectures on the history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant. He also planned to give a seminar for beginners on Locke and Leibniz -probably on Leibniz' Nouveaux Essais -and another seminar for more advanced students. But these projects did not come to fruition. Like the other phenomenologists, indeed like almost all German intellectuals of the time, Reinach was carried away by the enthusiasm which broke out after the declaration of war between Germany and the allied powers. He immediately volunteered for the army, and even exerted pressure to ensure that he be admitted into the service as quickly as possible. He was recruited in his home town of Mainz around the middle of August and after two weeks of training assigned to a reserve battery of the 21st Field Artillery Regiment of the 21st Reserve Division under the immediate command of his younger brother Heinrich. As a recruit he was posted to Gonsenheim, 'a tiny hole' in the neighbourhood of Mainz, before being transferred to France.
For the summer semester of 1915 Reinach announced lectures on the theory of cognition and seminars on Hume and on the aims and methods of aesthetics. But he announced these courses only 'with some pain,' as he wrote to Husserl, 'for after all, I will not in fact give them". From the 12th of February he was part of the assault group, still under the command of his brother but now fighting from the trenches against the French. His mood nevertheless remained fundamentally as it had been at the outbreak of the War. In a letter to Conrad-Martius of April 21, 1915 he spoke of the 'supreme happiness that has been granted to me in my life to stake all my earthly goods on something that is for me great and holy.' With this disregard for his own life, however, there went a high estimation of the sig- . Lipps' most important publication in this field is his "Die Paradoxien der Mengenlehre", Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 6, 1923, 561-71. The two volumes of Lipps 1927/28, which are dedicated to Reinach, also go back to Reinach's courses and seminars on the theory of cognition, and the influence of Reinach is manifest in the very titles of Lipps' writings. §9 EPILOGUE There are not many philosophers whose works were posthumously edited by their disciples -Hegel being of course the most famous example. Reinach's case is all the more conspicuous as his academic career -as a mere Privatdozent -lasted only slightly over four years. His Collected Writings of 1921, 'herausgegeben von seinen Schülern, as the title page indicates, constitute in themselves a worthy testimony to a philosopher who was described by Husserl, in his obituary of 1917, as 'one of the few firm and great hopes of contemporary philosophy'.
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On volunteering for the army in 1914, Reinach had given his wife Anna instructions to destroy his papers in case he should be killed. They were, in his view, mere drafts, not fit for publication. However, his widow kept them with her even after 1917, thus allowing for the posthumous publication in the Gesammelte Schriften of the lecture on phenomenology and of the pieces on movement and on impersonalia. When, however, Anna Reinach was herself forced to leave Germany in early 1942 as a result of the National Socialist persecution of the Jews, she finally burnt all of Reinach's papers. Under the signature Ana 379 the Bavarian State Library in Munich now houses a small number of surviving letters and other fragments, including the short curriculum vitae of Reinach by his wife Anna and the notes of Reinach's lectures and seminars taken by his students Margarete Ortmann and Winthrop Bell.
